America's Greenland Ambitions

U.S. interest in Greenland dates back to the 19th century.

After the 1867 Alaska purchase, American officials explored acquiring Greenland and Iceland, with later proposals even floating land swaps such as trading Mindanao for Greenland and the Danish West Indies in 1910, though only the West Indies sale eventually materialized in 1917.

By World War II, Washington's strategic gaze sharpened: with Denmark under Nazi occupation, the United States reached an agreement with Danish envoy Henrik Kauffmann in 1941 enabling U.S. military use of Greenland, laying the groundwork for a long-term defense role on the island. This wartime pivot reframed Greenland from a remote colony to a key node in North Atlantic security planning.

Postwar Strategic Interest

In the immediate postwar period, U.S. policymakers viewed Greenland as vital to homeland security. In April 1946, senior planners deemed acquiring the island indispensable, and on Dec. 14, 1946, Secretary of State James Byrnes formally offered Denmark $100 million in gold to purchase Greenland, even weighing a swap for oil-rich land in Alaska’s Point Barrow district. Copenhagen demurred, citing sovereignty and public sentiment; Danish foreign minister Gustav Rasmussen signaled clear resistance, and the offer quietly died.

From Wartime Access to Treaty Framework

Rather than ownership, Washington secured access through alliance arrangements. The 1951 Defense of Greenland Agreement, rooted in NATO's collective defense, authorized the U.S. to construct, install, maintain, and operate defense areas, while affirming Danish sovereignty and joint-use provisions.

The U.S. built Thule Air Base (now Pituffik Space Base) in 1952, initially as a refueling hub and later as an early-warning and space-surveillance site, reflecting the island's location along the shortest polar routes and missile arcs. Negotiations were asymmetric but not coercive: Denmark leveraged sovereignty, time pressure, and alliance ties to shape the terms, even as the outcomes favored U.S. objectives.

Cold War Footprint and Greenland's Autonomy

Through the Cold War, the U.S. operated multiple sites across Greenland, many later abandoned, leaving an environmental legacy that continues to surface as ice melts, including waste from Camp Century and fallout from a 1968 B-52 crash near Thule. Over time, Greenland’s status evolved. It gained home rule in 1979 and later deeper self-government, while the 1946 purchase documents, declassified in the 1970s, were publicly reported by the Danish press in 1991, reviving historical memory of the aborted sale.

Today, Pituffik remains central to missile warning and space domain awareness, functionally sustained by the 1951 framework that still anchors U.S.-Danish-Greenland defense cooperation.

In August 2019, reports surfaced that Trump had asked advisers about purchasing Greenland, describing it as a real estate transaction.

Greenlandic and Danish leaders swiftly rejected the notion, with Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen calling the idea "absurd" and asserting that "Greenland is not for sale. Greenland is Greenlandic." The episode drew wider criticism in Denmark, where politicians and the royal household expressed surprise at the floated purchase and at the diplomatic friction it created.

Canceled Visit and Rhetorical Escalation

Following Frederiksen's remarks, Trump canceled a planned early September state visit to Copenhagen, stating there was no point if discussion of a Greenland sale was off the table. Danish officials were caught off guard, while U.S. messaging veered between rebuke and outreach, with the president later praising Danes as "incredible people" even as he circulated a satirical image of a "Trump Tower" in Greenland. The move briefly strained ties but also embedded Greenland in contemporary U.S. political discourse in a way not seen for decades.

Quiet Cooperation Resumes

Despite tensions, practical cooperation advanced. In 2019, the U.S. and Greenland agreed on an aerial survey using hyperspectral imaging to assess mineral potential, with data support envisioned from the U.S. Geological Survey. The following year, Denmark approved reopening a U.S. consulate in Nuuk, shuttered since 1953, reflecting a broader Arctic policy push that also included a $12.1 million U.S. economic support package for Greenlandic civilian projects in minerals, tourism and education.

Strategic Framing and Alliance Management

U.S. officials framed the Arctic as an arena for competition with Russia and China, echoing concerns about dual-use investments and infrastructure. Even as Washington emphasized Greenland’s value, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo praised Denmark’s allied role and signaled interest in strengthening cooperation with the Kingdom of Denmark, including Greenland. The 2019 flap reportedly elevated Greenland’s profile, while reinforcing the usefulness of alliance-based access and economic engagement over territorial acquisition.

In a Truth Social post on Dec. 22, 2024, Trump announced Ken Howery as his choice for U.S. Ambassador to the Kingdom of Denmark, stating that “For purposes of National Security and Freedom throughout the World, the United States of America feels that the ownership and control of Greenland is an absolute necessity.

Throughout 2025, the administration then intensified its focus on Greenland. In March 2025, U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance made an uninvited and widely criticized visit to Greenland, remaining solely at Pituffik, the long-standing U.S. military base, and not meeting any of the island’s roughly 57,000 residents.

Speaking to reporters, he said the U.S. needed to "wake up" to China's and Russia's ambitions on the island, adding, "We can't just bury our head in the sand — or, in Greenland, bury our head in the snow.” Greenland's government denounced the trip as "highly aggressive," with Prime Minister Jens-Frederik Nielsen rejecting Trump's bid for control of the Arctic territory, stating: "The United States will not get it."

Appointment of US Ambassador to Greenland

In December 2025, Trump appointed a special envoy to Greenland as part of his broader effort to take control of the semiautonomous Danish territory. In a Truth Social post, Trump said that he had selected Louisiana Governor Jeff Landry, a close political ally, for the role because he "understands how essential Greenland is to our National Security, and will strongly advance our Country’s Interests for the Safety, Security, and Survival of our Allies."

2026 Escalation

In early January 2026, after a U.S. military operation to seize Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, White House statements said military force against Greenland was "always an option," with Trump on Jan. 4 telling reporters, "let's talk about Greenland in 20 days."

Trump further argued Greenland was "covered with Russian and Chinese ships all over the place," framing urgency around countering adversaries. Greenland's business minister and residents cited by AP indicated no awareness of such deployments near the island's coasts, undercutting claims of imminent naval encroachment.

Danish, Greenlandic Foreign Ministers Visit US

On Jan. 14, 2026, the foreign ministers of Denmark and Greenland met with Vance and Rubio in the White House. Denmark's foreign minister, Lars Rasmussen, said the parties "have a fundamental disagreement, but we also agree to disagree, and therefore we will continue to talk."

Rasmussen, a former two-time prime minister of Denmark, said at a joint press conference with Vivian Motzfeldt that he saw the meeting as an opportunity "to push back against the narrative," adding that claims of widespread Chinese military activity in the region were inaccurate. "According to our intelligence," he said, "we haven’t had a Chinese warship in Greenland for a decade or so."

US Tariffs

On Jan. 17, Trump escalated further by announcing a 10% tariff on goods from Denmark, Norway, Sweden, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Finland, increasing to 25% on June 1 unless a Greenland purchase deal is finalized, citing these nations' opposition and alleged military deployments as threats to global security.

This prompted massive "Hands Off Greenland" protests in Copenhagen and other Danish cities, with thousands chanting "Greenland is not for sale" and waving Greenlandic flags, alongside a demonstration in Nuuk drawing a significant portion of the island's population.

Concurrently, a bipartisan U.S. congressional delegation, led by Sen. Chris Coons (D-DE) and including Republicans like Sen. Lisa Murkowski (R-AK), visited Denmark to reassure locals that most Americans oppose the takeover, emphasizing Greenland as an ally rather than an asset and aiming to de-escalate tensions.

As Trump's statements about acquiring Greenland have intensified, members of Congress have introduced several bills — both supporting and opposing such efforts.

On Feb. 10, 2025, Representative Buddy Carter introduced legislation proposing to rename Greenland as "Red, White, and Blueland" and to authorize Trump to "purchase or otherwise acquire" the territory.

Carter stated, “When our Negotiator-in-Chief signs this historic agreement, we will proudly welcome the people of what is now Greenland to join the freest nation in history. President Trump has rightly identified this purchase as a national security priority." The bill directs the Department of the Interior to update all federal documents to reflect the new name within six months of the legislation's passage.

Make Greenland Great Again Act

On Jan. 13, 2026, Representative Andy Ogles introduced legislation in the U.S. House of Representatives to authorize the federal government to acquire Greenland for the United States, providing Congress with a 60-day review period before the integration of Greenlandic territory. At the time of its introduction, the bill had 12 co-sponsors and was referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs for consideration.

Greenland Sovereignty Protection Act

On Jan. 13, 2026, Representative Jimmy Gomez also introduced the Greenland Sovereignty Protection Act, legislation aimed at prohibiting the use of federal funds to support the invasion, annexation or any other attempt by the United States to acquire Greenland. "Greenland is not for sale, not for conquest, and not a bargaining chip," Gomez said, adding that "Threatening to seize territory from an ally undermines international law and destabilizes one of the most important alliances in NATO. This bill makes clear that Congress will not fund Donald Trump’s imperial ambitions."

NATO Unity Protection Act

On Jan. 13, 2026, Republican Senator Lisa Murkowski of Alaska and Democratic Senator Jeanne Shaheen of New Hampshire, the ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, jointly introduced legislation to prevent Trump from taking control of Greenland. The measure, titled the NATO Unity Protection Act, would bar the use of Department of Defense or Department of State funds to blockade, occupy, annex or otherwise assert control over the sovereign territory of a NATO member state.

Trump's rhetoric on Greenland has prompted strong reactions from European allies, Greenlandic leaders, and international institutions.

In early 2026, leaders from France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, the United Kingdom and Denmark issued a joint statement affirming that Greenland “belongs to its people” and that only Denmark and Greenland can decide matters concerning the territory.

The statement framed Arctic security as a collective NATO priority and underscored respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders. This aligned with repeated Danish reminders that Greenland is covered by the alliance’s collective defense guarantees.

EU Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius and Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen warned that any military intervention would effectively dismantle NATO. "No provision [in the alliance's 1949 founding treaty] envisions an attack on one NATO ally by another one," stated a NATO diplomat speaking anonymously. Jess Berthelsen, chair of SIK, Greenland's national trade union confederation, noted: "We are not for sale and that we will not be annexed." An estimated 84% of about 57,000 Greenlanders support independence, according to a 2025 poll.

Meanwhile, on Jan. 14, 2026, the European Parliament reaffirmed its strong support for multilateralism and the rules-based international order, warning that any attempt to undermine the sovereignty or territorial integrity of Denmark and Greenland would violate international law and the United Nations Charter.

Greenlandic Consensus on Self-Determination

Greenland's political leadership delivered a unified message. The prime minister and leaders of five parties declared: "We don’t want to be Americans, we don’t want to be Danes, we want to be Greenlanders," insisting Greenland's future be decided by its people without external pressure.

Subsequent comments by Greenland's incoming leader emphasized strengthening ties with Denmark while rejecting any U.S. takeover, noting partnership must be grounded in mutual respect and international law. Polling has shown strong public opposition to U.S. control and a preference for self-determination within the Danish realm’s legal framework.

Inuit Response

Inuit leaders, including Sara Olsvig of the Inuit Circumpolar Council, have framed the U.S. push as "ongoing colonialism," rejecting the notion of a "better colonizer" and emphasizing UNDRIP rights to free, prior, and informed consent. They warn that the acquisition threatens cultural survival amid climate threats.

Copenhagen's Warnings and Domestic Debate

Danish officials warned that any military action against Greenland would undermine NATO. Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen stated the U.S. has no right to annex Greenland and predicted Greenland will remain an autonomous territory of Denmark for "some time," alongside calls to modernize the union and strengthen Greenland's economy. Danish party positions broadly support Greenland's right to independence, reflecting long-standing recognition that any status change must reflect Greenlandic consent.

Regional and Procedural Signals

Greenlandic politicians and parties urged the use of proper diplomatic channels, with local media highlighting concerns about visits by foreign dignitaries during government formation periods, given the absence of established procedures.

European institutions' materials continued to recognize Greenland’s self-government and autonomy arrangements under the 2009 Self-Government Act, within which any independence would require Greenlandic decision and negotiation with Denmark. The messaging across Nuuk and Copenhagen stresses respect for alliances and rule-of-law processes as the basis for any future changes.

U.S. Domestic Perception

Recent polls indicate broad U.S. domestic opposition to the acquisition, with a Reuters/Ipsos survey showing only 17% approval (including 40% of Republicans) and 71% viewing military force as a "bad idea"; a CNN poll found 75% opposing U.S. control, with Republicans split 50-50 and Democrats at 94% against. This internal pushback was echoed by the bipartisan congressional delegation's visit on Jan. 17, where leaders like Sen. Coons sought to reassure Denmark and Greenland, stating most Americans reject the idea and that Russia/China do not pose imminent threats.

Russian and Chinese Reactions

Russia responded to Trump's Greenland ambitions on Jan. 16, when Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov called the situation "unusual, I would even say extraordinary from the standpoint of international law," adding that Trump has indicated "international law does not represent any kind of priority [or] substance for him." Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova warned that "any attempts to ignore Russia's interests in the Arctic, especially in the sphere of security, will not go unanswered," vowing to strengthen defense capabilities and infrastructure in the Arctic.

China, meanwhile, rebuked the U.S., with Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian accusing Washington of "using the so-called China threat as a pretext for itself to seek selfish gains" in the Arctic while pursuing its own expansionist agenda. Beijing emphasizes its activities as peaceful and scientific, having declared itself a "near-Arctic state" in 2018, rejecting what it calls U.S. hypocrisy in framing Arctic competition.

Greenland's position along the GIUK gap connects the Arctic and Atlantic theaters, playing a critical role in sea control and anti-submarine operations.

From a geostrategic perspective, the Arctic can be viewed as an integrated domain, with Greenland serving as a central node for surveillance and military basing along a northern defense line extending from Alaska to Greenland and across the Greenland–Svalbard–Norway corridor.

This strategic location complements the Pituffik Space Base, which provides missile warning, missile defense and space-domain awareness — capabilities that remain vital as polar routes shorten potential missile trajectories across the high north.

Russian and Chinese Involvement

Russia has modernized its Arctic posture by developing advanced bases and long-range military capabilities, while China has expanded dual-use research initiatives and under-ice operations, presenting itself as a "near-Arctic" power. In 2025, Chinese research submarines operated beneath Arctic ice to collect oceanographic data supporting submarine navigation.

U.S. and NATO officials have highlighted joint Sino-Russian activity and its implications for detection, access and regional security. These developments increase the strategic significance of the GIUK gap and northern approaches, where Greenland's geography is likely critical for NATO sensing and operational response.

Minerals and Supply Chains

Greenland contains substantial rare earth resources, including major deposits such as Tanbreez and Kvanefjeld. Efforts by Western nations to reduce reliance on Chinese dominance in mining and refining have underscored Greenland's strategic potential.

This was exemplified by the 2024–2025 initiative, which culminated in the Critical Metals agreement, which secured a controlling stake in Tanbreez to support U.S.-aligned supply chains. However, resource extraction is constrained by harsh climatic conditions, limited infrastructure and the need for local social license, indicating that any meaningful contribution to global supply chains would be long-term and require coordinated allied investment.

Existing Access vs Sovereignty Transfer

The 1951 U.S.–Denmark defense agreement grants the United States extensive rights to construct and operate military facilities in Greenland, while maintaining Danish sovereignty and provisions for joint use. European briefing materials emphasize Greenland's self-governing status within the Kingdom of Denmark and the growing EU–Greenland cooperation in areas such as raw materials and infrastructure.

Russia has significantly reinforced its Arctic military presence, controlling a range of strategic forces under its Joint Strategic Command North, including nuclear submarines, guided missile warships and strategic bombers.

Russia maintains the world's largest icebreaker fleet and numerous military facilities across the Arctic, asserting sovereignty and protecting economic interests along the Northern Sea Route. These capabilities underline Moscow's emphasis on projecting power in the High North, which Western officials view as part of broader geopolitical competition.

China's Growing Arctic Engagement

China has expanded its Arctic engagement through scientific research, infrastructure investments and strategic initiatives despite lacking a permanent military presence. It operates research stations, such as the Yellow River Station in Svalbard, and collaborates on facilities, such as the China-Iceland Arctic Science Observatory.

Beijing also invests in icebreakers and participates in the development of the Northern Sea Route with Russia. While China labels its activity as peaceful cooperation and climate science, its dual-use capabilities and broader strategic ambitions raise concerns in Western capitals.

Russia–China Strategic Arctic Cooperation

Russia and China are deepening strategic cooperation in the Arctic through joint economic and military signaling. They have agreed on infrastructure investments, including deep-sea ports and Arctic shipping routes, and are conducting joint operations, such as bomber flights and coast guard patrols in Arctic waters.

This partnership supports China's access to the Northern Sea Route and reflects a shared interest in countering Western influence. Moscow's dominant geographic position in the Arctic enables sustained cooperation, while Beijing supports Russia through capital and technology transfers.

U.S. and NATO Views on Russian and Chinese Activity

U.S. and NATO military leaders have expressed concern that Russian and Chinese activity in the Arctic is driven by strategic, not peaceful, objectives. NATO has expanded its deterrence posture, citing increased joint patrols, Chinese research vessels in Arctic waters and coordinated operations with Russia as indicators of adversary intent. These developments motivate efforts to strengthen surveillance, infrastructure and allied cooperation in Greenland and the broader High North to maintain security and stability.