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The region's chronic instability is less about colonial history and more about the failure of post-independence leaders to build effective institutions and provide security. Military coups, while unfortunate, have sometimes been necessary to restore order amid rampant corruption, mismanagement and rising jihadist threats. International support — whether from France, the United States, or even Russia — remains crucial to containing extremist violence and preventing state collapse.
The persistent instability and violence in West Africa are the direct result of colonial-era decisions that ignored local realities and prioritized European interests. Arbitrary borders, extractive economies and divisive governance structures have left states weak, fractured and vulnerable to coups and insurgencies. Neocolonial economic arrangements and foreign interventions continue to undermine true sovereignty and development, trapping the region in cycles of dependency and unrest. Genuine progress demands a reckoning with these colonial legacies and a radical reimagining of governance and economic autonomy.
Empires such as Ghana (Wagadu), Mali, Songhai, Oyo, Kanem-Bornu and the Hausa city-states governed extensive and diverse territories through intricate systems of administration, taxation and diplomacy. Their influence rested not only on military power but on institutions that balanced trade, religion and knowledge.
Cities like Timbuktu, Gao and Kano became cosmopolitan hubs where scholars, merchants and artisans exchanged ideas and goods across the Sahara and beyond.
Power in precolonial West Africa was rarely monolithic. Across the region, authority took many forms shaped by environment, economy and belief. Some areas were ruled by powerful monarchies that commanded armies, managed tribute and coordinated vast territories.
In turn, others relied on councils of elders, lineage leaders or religious authorities who governed through negotiation, consensus and custom. This diversity of governance — from imperial courts to kin-based assemblies — created a resilient political tradition that colonial rule disrupted but did not completely extinguish.
Vast trans-Saharan and regional trade routes connected goldfields, salt mines and markets from the Atlantic coast to the Nile valley. Caravans and river fleets carried not only goods but also ideas — artistic styles, technologies and legal traditions that crossed linguistic and religious boundaries. Through this constant movement of people and exchange, the Sahel and its hinterlands became a shared economic and cultural zone, integrated by mobility and mutual influence.
Learning and belief were deeply rooted in West Africa's own traditions of oral scholarship, historical narration and spiritual philosophy. From the 8th century onward, engagement with North Africa and the Islamic world added to these traditions rather than replacing them. Islamic scholarship, literacy and jurisprudence found fertile ground in societies that already valued knowledge and moral order.
Rulers such as Mansa Musa adopted the pilgrimage to Mecca and diplomatic exchange as extensions of their existing statecraft, situating the Mali Empire within a wider Afro-Eurasian world while maintaining distinctly West African forms of governance and identity.
West Africa's great empires flourished through contact and exchange with the wider world. The arrival of Islam, literacy and long-distance trade introduced new tools of statecraft, writing, taxation and scholarship that transformed local chiefdoms into urban civilizations. Without the administrative and intellectual frameworks brought through trans-Saharan networks, empires like Mali and Songhai might never have reached their scale or global renown. Civilization in the region was not born in isolation but through the spark of external connection.
Long before Islam or European trade, West Africans built complex states, vast markets and enduring cultural traditions. The Ghana and Nok civilizations predated foreign contact by centuries, proving that literacy, metallurgy and organized governance were not imported but locally conceived. External influences later enriched these systems, but the foundations of political innovation, craftsmanship and philosophical thought were distinctly African. To claim otherwise repeats a colonial myth that social and political sophistication arrived from elsewhere.
European powers convened at the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 to partition the continent into spheres of influence, creating artificial borders that grouped diverse peoples into new colonial states. Driven by economic interests and strategic ambitions, colonial powers imposed administrative systems that fundamentally reshaped the region's political and social fabric, though outcomes differed across territories.
Colonial rule in West Africa was marked by diverse administrative approaches, with the French and British employing distinct systems, though hybrids and local adaptations were common. The French established the Federation of French West Africa (AOF), a centralized structure governed from Dakar.
French policy initially emphasized assimilation, aiming to transform colonial subjects into French citizens, but later shifted to association, preserving local customs only when they did not challenge French authority.
The British, in contrast, favored indirect rule, governing through existing local power structures and traditional rulers — a system that often entrenched or even created new ethnic divisions and hierarchies. Both models prioritized resource extraction and political control over genuine development or self-governance.
The colonial economy in West Africa was fundamentally extractive, designed to serve European interests. Colonial administrations imposed taxes payable only in colonial currencies, compelling Africans to engage in cash-crop production or wage labor. Infrastructure such as railways and ports was constructed primarily to facilitate the export of raw materials — including groundnuts, cocoa, cotton and minerals.
Limited investments in health and education existed but were uneven and did not necessarily alter the fundamental structure of this system of administration. Forced labor, land appropriation and the suppression of local industries were widespread, with colonial authorities often tolerating or reinforcing servitude to maintain economic output. These policies disrupted traditional livelihoods and deepened social and regional inequalities.
Upon independence, West African states inherited administrative systems and borders that did not necessarily reflect the region's diverse societies. Colonial administrations had prioritized resource extraction and political control rather than building inclusive institutions or fostering sustainable development. Still, some argue that colonial-era administrations expanded infrastructure and laid the groundwork of modern institutions despite their extractive qualities.
In the post-independence era, institutional trajectories diverged. Countries such as Ghana and later Cape Verde achieved comparatively stable governance despite their colonial legacies, while countries like Sierra Leone have suffered devastating internal conflicts.
While some countries achieved independence through peaceful negotiations and referendums, others endured protracted struggles or episodes of violent resistance. The year 1960 — often called the "Year of Africa" — marked a wave of independence across the continent, with 17 African nations, including Senegal, Mali, Nigeria and the Ivory Coast, emerging as sovereign states.
These transitions were driven not only by African demands for self-determination but also by the changing priorities of colonial powers weakened by World War II and confronted with mounting international and domestic pressure.
The immediate post-independence era was marked by a flurry of political experimentation and regional ambitions. In French West Africa, the collapse of the French Fourth Republic and the rise of Charles de Gaulle led to a 1958 referendum offering colonies a choice between autonomy within the French Community or immediate independence.
Guinea, under Sékou Touré, was the only territory to vote for outright independence, prompting France to abruptly withdraw all support and infrastructure — a move that left Guinea isolated but symbolically triumphant.
Senegal and Mali initially sought unity through the Mali Federation, a short-lived experiment in regional integration that dissolved within months due to deep political and ideological divides.
The first years of independence were marked by the urgent task of creating nation-states out of colonial entities. New governments faced the challenge of forging unity across ethnic, linguistic and religious lines while building schools, institutions and economies.
Leaders sought to define what "modernity" meant in an African context — balancing inherited institutions with indigenous values. Writers, teachers and musicians joined this search for identity, using culture as a form of colonial resistance and the renewal of tradition.
The euphoria of liberation carried with it a wider vision: that the freedom of one nation could not be complete without the freedom of all. Across West Africa, figures like Kwame Nkrumah, Léopold Sédar Senghor and Sékou Touré championed Pan-Africanism as the moral foundation for a new continental order.
Conferences in Accra and Addis Ababa called for political and economic unity, yet rival ideologies and leadership ambitions soon divided the movement. Still, the dream endured — a promise that Africa's future lay in cooperation, not fragmentation.
Ghana, the first sub-Saharan African country to gain independence in 1957, set a precedent when its charismatic leader, Kwame Nkrumah, was overthrown in a military coup in February 1966 while abroad. The coup leaders cited authoritarian tendencies and economic problems, while declassified documents suggest external interference as a driving force.
Nkrumah's overthrow marked a turning point in African political history, heralding what scholars describe as the "coup phenomenon" that would dominate the continent for decades.
By the 1970s and 1980s, coups had become almost routine in West Africa, which recorded more successful and attempted military takeovers than any other region of the continent. Between 1960 and 1990, Africa saw an average of over twenty successful coups per decade, with West Africa being a critical hotspot.
Nigeria, the continent's most populous nation, experienced eight coup attempts — six of them successful — between 1960 and 1999. These recurring upheavals reflected weak civilian institutions, economic crises and colonial legacies, but also country-specific dynamics such as oil politics in Nigeria.
Both Western and Eastern bloc powers viewed West Africa as a strategic battleground and sometimes supported or facilitated regime change to protect their interests. This broader Cold War environment provided both resources and rationale for military interventions.
External involvement varied by case and remains the subject of ongoing historical research. Many African leaders joined the Non-Aligned Movement to signal sovereignty and avoid becoming pawns of either superpower.
One commonly cited example of external interference in support of regime change during this period was the 1987 overthrow of Thomas Sankara, the Prime Minister of Burkina Faso. Though it is currently unconfirmed, many believe that France, and possibly the United States, supported the coup against Sankara, as he agitated against Western influence in Burkina Faso.
While some coups were initially welcomed as responses to crises, they often transformed into new forms of repression and economic hardship. In Ghana, the National Liberation Council, which replaced Nkrumah, failed to restore parliamentary democracy as promised, leading to further cycles of military and civilian rule.
Across the region, frequent military interventions eroded public trust in political institutions and set dangerous precedents for the resolution of political disputes. By the early 2000s, regional bodies such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union had begun adopting stronger anti-coup norms, although enforcement has remained uneven.
These takeovers are not isolated incidents. Instead, they are concentrated in a belt of instability stretching from Mali to Sudan, where unchecked violence, economic hardship and weak state institutions have undermined civilian authority and public trust. Surveys show that while Africans broadly value democracy, support for military intervention rises sharply when elected governments fail to provide security or basic services.
Underlying the political turbulence are deep-seated economic and social challenges. West Africa's population is young and rapidly growing, with youth unemployment soaring as job creation lags far behind demographic trends. The region's economies remain locked into raw-commodity exports and import dependency, a legacy reinforced by unequal trade relations, foreign debt and donor-driven development agendas.
Limited industrialization and value-added production perpetuate cycles of poverty and inequality, while revenues from gold, oil and cocoa often flow outward through multinational networks. Corruption and uneven service delivery further erode public trust — especially among young people who see few opportunities and view both domestic elites and foreign partners as complicit in the status quo.
Demographic trends in the central Sahel place exceptional pressure on weak labor markets. Mali's median age is around 16, and nearly half of Niger's population is under 15, producing one of the fastest-growing youth cohorts globally.
Each year, far more young people seek work than the formal economy can absorb, leaving many in low-income or insecure employment. This persistent imbalance deepens frustration with state institutions and increases the appeal of migration routes, local militias or armed groups that offer alternative forms of income or protection.
The security landscape in West Africa and the Sahel has deteriorated sharply. According to Global Terrorism Index data, the region now accounts for nearly half of all global deaths from jihadist violence. Armed groups such as Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State - Sahel Province (ISSP) have exploited state weakness, communal tensions and resource scarcity to expand their influence.
Additionally, farmer-herder conflicts, exacerbated by climate change and population pressures, have become deadlier and more frequent, with over 15,000 deaths linked to such violence in the past decade.
Organized crime — including drug trafficking and kidnapping for ransom — has also flourished in the absence of effective governance.
Environmental stress has moved from the margins into the core of Sahel instability. The progressive shrinkage of Lake Chad, shifting seasonal rainfall and desert encroachment have undermined rural livelihoods and shaped new patterns of mobility.
Traditional herder-farmer arrangements have broken down as pastures vanish and negotiated governance systems weaken. Armed groups exploit the resulting void by controlling routes, taxing mobility and stepping into the role of de facto order-providers.
Regional organizations like ECOWAS have struggled to respond effectively to the wave of coups and mounting insecurity. While the regional bloc has a long history of political and military intervention, its recent actions, such as sanctions, mediation and threats of military action, have often met with resistance or outright defiance.
The withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger from ECOWAS and the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) highlight growing dissatisfaction with regional bodies perceived as ineffective or beholden to external interests.
Meanwhile, the decline of Western influence — particularly that of France — and the rise of new security partnerships with Russia, including the deployment of the Wagner Group and the Africa Corps, signal a shifting geopolitical landscape.
The convergence of political instability, economic hardship and insecurity has exacted a heavy toll on the people of West Africa and the Sahel. Millions have been displaced by violence and conflict, food insecurity has reached record levels and public trust in institutions continues to erode.
Groups like Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State - Sahel Province (ISSP) have driven a dramatic surge in attacks and fatalities across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. JNIM, an al-Qaeda affiliate formed in 2017, has expanded operations into Burkina Faso, Niger, and toward the northern borders of coastal West African states, while the ISSP has consolidated territorial control in parts of Mali and Niger.
In the first half of 2024, reported fatalities across these three countries reached a record-high of 7,620 — a figure based on ACLED estimates.
Though jihadist movements were present in West Africa before 2011, the overthrow of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi created an opportunity for militant groups to expand their influence. Following an uprising, Gaddafi was overthrown by a NATO-backed coalition of rebel groups. The violence quickly spread to neighboring Mali, where jihadists and Tuareg rebels took control of the country's north using weapons from Libya.
France intervened in January 2013 to prevent the Malian government from collapsing as part of Operation Serval. However, instability continued, with Libyan weapons fueling conflicts across West Africa and the Middle East.
Jihadist groups have evolved beyond hit-and-run attacks, increasingly seeking to govern and embed themselves in local societies. JNIM has established shadow administrations, collecting taxes and providing basic services such as justice and security in areas under its control.
ISSP has shifted from mass violence to more structured territorial control, particularly in Mali's Menaka and Gao regions, setting up market regulations, Islamic courts and strict enforcement of Islamic law. Both groups exploit local grievances — ethnic tensions, state abuses and lack of services — to gain legitimacy and support among marginalized groups.
In central Mali, violence between Fulani pastoralists and Dogon or Bambara farming communities reflects long-standing patterns of competition over land, mobility and local authority. These tensions are reinforced by militia formation and by local elites who use identity and customary claims to consolidate influence.
Reports of abusive operations by segments of the Malian and Burkinabè security forces, often directed at Fulani populations, further weaken trust in the state and create openings for groups like JNIM, which embed themselves by providing protection and adjudication where official institutions are absent or contested.
The humanitarian consequences of the violence have been severe. Millions have been displaced, thousands of schools have closed and over 12.7 million people are food insecure in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Violence now threatens relatively stable coastal states such as Benin, Togo and the Ivory Coast.
These developments are now viewed as part of a wider southward shift in the conflict's dynamics, reinforcing concerns already present among the region's coastal states. Porous northern borders, the increasing use of forest reserves and national parks for staging and transit and the emergence of small logistical cells in frontier zones have heightened perceptions of vulnerability.
As the security architecture in the Sahel deteriorates, these governments have expanded surveillance and intensified joint operations to prevent armed groups from establishing a durable presence along their northern corridors.
Jihadist groups have entrenched themselves by tapping into local economies and illicit networks. Their ability to adapt to local contexts — by exploiting communal tensions and providing alternative governance — has allowed them to persist despite international military interventions.
Yet these networks are often seen as not purely indigenous, with foreign powers allegedly supporting or tolerating them to extend influence or destabilize rivals through covert funding, intelligence operations and proxy conflicts.
Efforts to counter the spread of jihadist groups have been hampered by the withdrawal of French and U.N. peacekeeping forces and the dissolution of regional security initiatives like the G5 Sahel. Heavy-handed tactics by security forces also sometimes deepen local resentment and inadvertently aid extremist recruitment.
As a result, the Sahel's crisis is not just a security challenge but a humanitarian and governance emergency, with the risk of further spillover into the wider West African region if current trends continue.
This trend is concentrated in what analysts describe as a "coup belt" — a band of instability stretching from the Atlantic coast through Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger toward Sudan. These events have not only disrupted constitutional order but also triggered a dramatic shift in regional alliances and security dynamics. Nine coups in seven countries since 2020 illustrate the scale of this reversal.
The renewed wave of coups reflects a convergence of deep security crises, governance shortcomings and widespread public frustration. Across the Sahel, years of worsening violence, corruption and stalled development have eroded confidence in elected leaders and institutions.
Military officers have drawn on this discontent to legitimize their takeovers, presenting themselves as corrective forces amid state collapse. Public opinion surveys indicate that acceptance of military intervention increases sharply where governments are seen as unable to ensure safety, justice or essential services.
A defining feature of the recent coups has been the reshaping of foreign partnerships amid growing public criticism of France's long-standing military presence in the region. Once regarded as a key security partner against jihadist groups, France has faced mounting skepticism over the effectiveness of its counterterrorism operations, as violence has persisted and expanded from Mali into Burkina Faso and Niger.
In this context, the new military governments have sought alternative alliances, including security cooperation with Russia and the deployment of private military contractors such as the Wagner group.
The recent wave of coups has destabilized long-standing regional alliances and eroded mechanisms of collective security. Confronted with ECOWAS sanctions and diplomatic isolation, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger withdrew from the bloc and created the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).
Presenting themselves as defenders of sovereignty and regional self-determination, the three governments frame the AES as both a shield against external pressure and a vehicle for redefining West Africa’s balance of power.
The human impact of these upheavals has been severe. Armed violence linked to jihadist and communal conflicts has intensified, forcing millions to flee their homes and deepening an already acute food crisis across the Sahel. Infrastructure and basic services have deteriorated in many rural areas, while humanitarian access remains limited.
At the same time, the new military authorities have tightened control over the media and civic space, citing security imperatives. Political transitions have been delayed or redefined, leaving uncertainty over when and how civilian governance might effectively return.
Amid regional volatility, several states illustrate more resilient paths. Ghana has combined steady democratic turnover with reinvested oil revenues and strong anti-coup political norms. The Ivory Coast has sustained robust growth in manufacturing and agricultural processing, supported by long-term investment and improved infrastructure. Senegal's 2024 election delivered a peaceful transfer of power, while the Accra Initiative — a security framework linking coastal states on early-warning and joint border operations— has strengthened joint planning among coastal states facing the potential spillover of violence.
Even in central Mali, locally mediated truces between Fulani herders and Dogon farmers show that community-level agreements can reduce violence where state authority is limited.
The succession of military takeovers has disrupted long-standing alliances, reshaped regional institutions, and sharply reduced Western — especially French — influence. The withdrawal of French and EU forces from Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso left a widening security vacuum that new external powers, from Russia to emerging regional players, have been quick to fill.
Russia has expanded its role in the Sahel as Western forces withdrew, presenting itself as a reliable security partner for governments seeking greater autonomy.
Through the rebranded "Africa Corps," now under the Ministry of Defense, Moscow provides training, equipment and strategic support in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. These partnerships often combine military assistance with resource agreements, reflecting a pragmatic exchange of security for access.
The shift to Russian-backed security cooperation in Mali and Burkina Faso has changed external alignments but not reduced overall violence. Civilian harm remains widespread, and documented atrocities by national forces operating alongside Russian-linked personnel have deepened local distrust.
Earlier French-led operations also caused civilian casualties, provoking popular resentment and anger toward the presence of French forces.
China's engagement is characterized by massive infrastructure investment and trade, largely under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China is now Africa's largest trading partner, with bilateral trade exceeding $282 billion in 2023. Critics warn of rising debt dependency and lack of transparency, though African governments often welcome Chinese loans for their scale and speed.
In the Sahel, Chinese firms are expanding mining operations and telecommunications infrastructure, signaling a shift from soft-power diplomacy to long-term economic entrenchment.
As these investments expand, China's role in the region has taken on broader strategic dimensions. Beyond publicized infrastructure projects, Chinese firms are now embedded in key mining ventures, including critical minerals, while state-backed financing and military-training programs deepen long-term partnerships.
This combination of economic presence and security cooperation reshapes patterns of dependency and gives Beijing growing influence over the policy choices and operational capacities of Sahelian states.
Turkey has rapidly expanded its diplomatic, economic and military presence in Africa. Ankara supplies drones and military equipment to partners such as Niger and Nigeria while stressing mutual benefit and state sovereignty.
Meanwhile, Gulf states — particularly the UAE and Saudi Arabia — have emerged as major investors in infrastructure and agriculture and as providers of military assistance. These actors often compete not only for resources but also for ideological influence, promoting models of governance rooted in conservative, security-first frameworks.
The geopolitical contest also unfolds in the information space, where regional governments, Western states and external partners all seek to shape public perception. Competing narratives frame Western disengagement as either overdue or dangerous, while new alliances are depicted as expressions of sovereignty or instruments of influence.
These overlapping campaigns reflect a wider struggle over legitimacy and control, often deepening polarization and reducing trust in regional institutions such as ECOWAS.
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