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Iran's protests are a clear rejection of a theocratic state that polices speech, bodies and belief. Cosmetic concessions won't fix a system built to crush dissent and enforce clerical power. International support should spotlight prisoners, fund independent media and isolate abusers. The state rode a revolution to power, then cemented rule through repression, making it fundamentally unable to reform. The international community should wake up to what Iranians want and support those out on the street.
The "protests" in Iran were an American and Israeli regime change plot. Security forces were violently assaulted and killed by rioters following the orders of their CIA and Mossad handlers, who openly admitted that they were actively working amongst the rioters. Iran reacted like any other country would, with authorities moving in to stop the chaos.
Western powers championing Iranian protesters while maintaining crippling sanctions is cynical hypocrisy. The 1953 CIA-backed coup overthrowing Iran's elected government proves fears of interference aren't paranoia — they're history. Sanctions devastate ordinary Iranians while strengthening hardliners who exploit external threats to justify repression. Real change must come from Iranians themselves, not powers whose meddling destroyed Iran's democracy and whose pressure now entrenches authoritarian rule.
U.S.–Iran engagement in the mid-20th century was shaped by World War II, the early Cold War, and Iran's strategic importance as a major oil producer bordering the Soviet Union.
Before 1941, the United States had limited direct political involvement in Iran. However, after the Allied occupation of Iran during World War II and the onset of Cold War competition, Tehran became a focal point of U.S. efforts to contain Soviet expansion and secure Western access to Middle Eastern energy. U.S. policymakers viewed Iran's location and resources as central to regional stability and global economic interests.
Under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Iran actively courted U.S. support as part of its broader modernization agenda. Early collaboration included economic and military assistance designed to strengthen Iran’s infrastructure and central government. This relationship was underpinned by the U.S. "Northern Tier" strategy, which aimed to create a buffer of pro-Western states between the Soviet Union and the oil-rich Gulf region.
In the 1950s, U.S. engagement expanded to include development initiatives such as educational exchanges and technical aid. These efforts were part of a broader push by Washington to foster stable, pro-Western governments that could resist both Soviet influence and internal instability.
This period also set the stage for deeper economic ties and eventual nuclear cooperation. However, the modernization project, framed around rapid social change and dependency on Western alliances, fueled internal political tensions, especially among nationalists and critics of Western interference, laying the groundwork for later crises.
The central flashpoint in early U.S.–Iran relations was the oil nationalization crisis of the early 1950s, which culminated in the 1953 coup. In 1951, Iran's Parliament, under Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, passed legislation to nationalize the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), seeking to wrest control of Iranian oil resources from foreign domination and redirect profits to domestic development. This move quickly became a symbol of Iranian nationalism and economic sovereignty, but alarmed both Britain and the U.S.
Britain, heavily invested in AIOC, pressured the U.S. to intervene, arguing that nationalization threatened Western economic interests and might open the door to Soviet influence. Despite initial reluctance, after the Eisenhower administration took office, the U.S. allied with British intelligence to orchestrate Operation Ajax, a clandestine coup in August 1953 that ousted Mosaddegh and enabled the Shah — previously a weak constitutional monarch — to consolidate power and rule with far greater authority.
The aftermath of the coup consolidated pro-Western rule under the Shah and deepened Iran's integration into the U.S. strategic orbit. Western oil companies were reintegrated into Iran's oil sector through negotiated agreements that gave them significant shares and operational influence, reversing many aspects of Mosaddegh's nationalization effort. While Western policymakers hailed the outcome as a Cold War victory, many Iranians viewed it as foreign domination over national affairs, sowing deep resentment and mistrust.
After the 1953 coup, Iran became a linchpin of U.S. strategy in the Middle East during the 1950s and 1960s. Under the Shah, Iran aligned closely with American interests, as the U.S. aimed to counter Soviet influence in a region vital for Western energy supplies. Economic and military assistance flooded into Iran, reinforcing its role as a key ally in U.S. containment policy.
Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, oil revenues fueled rapid economic growth, infrastructure development, and ambitious industrial expansion. Oil wealth was used to enhance industrial capacity, modernize agriculture and expand education. However, while this partnership fostered development and security for the Shah, it also entrenched socioeconomic inequalities and perceptions of Western domination, leading to rising domestic opposition in subsequent years.
During the late 1950s and 1960s, U.S.–Iran cooperation extended into the nuclear arena through President Dwight Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace program. This initiative aimed to promote peaceful nuclear energy while minimizing proliferation fears. In 1957, Iran and the U.S. signed a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement that facilitated the establishment of Iran's first nuclear research facilities, including a research reactor and nuclear fuel supplies. Iran later became an original signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, officially ratifying it in 1970, thus placing its nuclear activities under international safeguards.
Both U.S. policymakers and Iranian leaders viewed nuclear energy as a marker of progress and modernization, strategically aligning Iran with global atomic cooperation. However, the 1979 Islamic Revolution transformed this collaboration into a source of significant tension. The new Islamic Republic repudiated the Shah's pro-Western policies and sought to assert an independent nuclear agenda.
Following the revolution, Iran's nuclear pursuits were reinterpreted in the West as security threats, prompting sanctions and diplomatic pressure aimed at curtailing its enrichment activities. These rising tensions led to protracted negotiations, including the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the subsequent U.S. withdrawal from the agreement in 2018, deepening mistrust.
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U.S. engagement with Iran during the mid‑20th century combined strategic support with programs that helped build Iranian institutional capacity, educational exchange, and scientific cooperation. Beyond Cold War containment, U.S. cultural diplomacy and academic exchanges fostered people‑to‑people ties, trained Iranian professionals and helped integrate scientific communities. These exchanges contributed to mutual understanding and development in fields like health, engineering, and education — benefits that extended beyond geopolitics and enriched both societies.
Foreign interference — especially the 1953 coup — represents a defining breach of Iran's sovereignty. The nationalization of oil was a legitimate assertion of Iran's right to control its resources, and the coup's legacy of foreign meddling was a root cause of later tensions and a rallying point for resisting external pressure. Iran has a right to introduce policies aimed at defending independence and resisting Western influence in political and economic affairs.
U.S. "support" for Iran during the Shah era was a facade for imperial control, with the 1953 coup overthrowing democracy to secure oil interests. This interference radicalized Iranian politics, fueled anti-Americanism, and directly contributed to the 1979 revolution — proving regime-change operations often backfire, creating worse authoritarianism while harming civilians.
Decades of modernization under the Shah — in particular the White Revolution reforms, which included land redistribution and modernization programs launched in the 1960s — generated economic growth but also rapid inflation, corruption and social dislocation. Many Iranians felt excluded from the political process, and outlets for peaceful dissent were limited by the Shah's secret police, SAVAK, which employed widespread surveillance, torture and imprisonment against critics.
By the late 1970s, secular liberals, intellectuals, student activists and leftist organizations like the Tudeh Party re-emerged and joined the opposition. University protests and labor strikes signaled rising unrest. At the same time, traditional bazaar merchants — who had economic grievances tied to the Shah's policies — aligned with clerical networks, providing organizational support and funding for protests.
Importantly, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, despite being exiled since 1964, became the symbolic leader of the movement. His messages, disseminated via smuggled tapes and print, criticized the Shah's authoritarianism, Western alliances, and secular modernization, articulating a unifying narrative that resonated across classes and regions.
By late 1978, mass protests and strikes had paralyzed Iran's economy and government. The Shah's security forces proved unable or unwilling to suppress the nationwide demonstrations, and in January 1979, the Shah fled Iran. Two weeks later, Khomeini returned from exile to massive crowds, and the monarchy collapsed shortly thereafter.
Once the revolution succeeded in ousting the Shah, the coalition that had united against the monarchy quickly fractured over the question of Iran's political future. The most influential force was the network of clerics around Ayatollah Khomeini, who advocated not merely regime change but the establishment of a theocratic system grounded in Shiite Islamic principles. Central to this was the doctrine of Wilayat el-Faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist), which posited that governance should be led by a qualified Islamic jurist, merging religious authority with political power.
In April 1979, a national referendum overwhelmingly endorsed the creation of the Islamic Republic, effectively institutionalizing clerical oversight of the state. While many secular and leftist participants initially believed Khomeini would adopt a symbolic leadership role within a broader democratic framework, the clerical establishment rapidly consolidated control. Revolutionary institutions such as the Islamic Revolutionary Courts were established to try former officials and perceived enemies of the revolution, with hundreds of supporters of the Shah being executed in early 1979 as part of a broad purge.
The newly empowered Islamic Republican Party worked closely with Khomeini to marginalize rival political currents, effectively disbanding many secular or liberal parties and embedding clerical dominance into the constitutional structure. Political freedoms were curtailed under the justification of protecting the revolution and Islamic values.
The success of the Iranian Revolution challenged prevailing assumptions about stability in the Middle East and the durability of pro-Western governments. Until 1979, the Shah had been one of the U.S.' cornerstone allies in the region, serving as a bulwark against Soviet influence and a guarantor of stability in the oil-rich Gulf. The sudden collapse of this authoritarian alliance undermined decades of U.S. foreign policy and exposed Western intelligence and strategy as misjudging the depth of domestic discontent.
Globally, the revolution's success emboldened Islamist movements and altered geopolitical calculations in the Cold War context. Iran's transformation from a secular monarchy allied with the West into an anti-Western Islamic Republic symbolized the potency of religiously framed resistance against both domestic autocracy and foreign influence. The revolution’s ideological impact was felt across the Middle East, contributing to the rise of political Islam and inspiring Islamist movements in countries such as Lebanon, Egypt, and Algeria.
The regional balance of power also shifted: with the Shah gone, Iran's foreign policy became more assertive, including support for Shiite Islamist movements and a more confrontational posture toward Israel and other U.S. allies. The subsequent Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988) further entrenched revolutionary identity and solidified Iran's role as a major, if contentious, regional actor.
The Iranian Revolution precipitated an abrupt rupture in U.S.–Iran relations, driven largely by Washington's misreading of Iranian domestic dynamics and its continued support for the Shah. Despite increasing signs of widespread unrest in 1978, the Carter administration initially believed that the monarchy could be preserved or reformed, rooted in long-standing U.S. strategic interests in maintaining a stable ally in the oil-rich region.
When the Shah’s health deteriorated and his rule began to falter, U.S. policy became increasingly reactive. A pivotal moment came when the Shah, suffering from terminal illness, was allowed into the U.S. for medical treatment — a decision that sparked outrage in Tehran and fueled perceptions that the U.S. was attempting to intervene in Iran's internal affairs.
Tensions culminated later in 1979 due to the U.S. Embassy hostage crisis, when Iranian students seized the American diplomatic mission in Tehran. This event, and the subsequent breakdown in diplomatic relations, became defining features of U.S. domestic politics, contributing to President Carter's political challenges and shaping American perceptions of Iran as a hostile state. The severing of formal ties marked a decisive end to decades of alignment and set the stage for decades of adversarial interaction.
This concept, articulated by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, placed a supreme jurist at the apex of political authority, combining religious legitimacy with state power. Under the 1979 constitution, the Supreme Leader was endowed with extensive powers, including control over the armed forces, judiciary and key state appointments, effectively embedding clerical oversight across all major institutions. This system enveloped the elected branches — president, parliament and judiciary — within a framework where ultimate authority remained with religious jurists.
In practice, this resulted in a parallel power structure, where formal republican institutions coexisted with extralegal clerical bodies and revolutionary entities. Organizations such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and various committees answered directly to the Supreme Leader rather than the president or parliament.
After 1979, the Islamic Republic rapidly built a security establishment that reinforced clerical control while circumscribing executive governance. The cornerstone of this system was the IRGC, formed to preserve the revolution's ideals and protect the new government from internal and external threats.
Unlike Iran's conventional military, the IRGC was ideologically grounded, reporting directly to the Supreme Leader and tasked with defending the revolution's gains. Over time, it grew from a militia into one of the most powerful institutions in the country, with its own ground, air and naval forces, as well as intelligence and economic wings.
The Guardian Council — which vets legislation and electoral candidates — and the Expediency Council further constrain executive power by aligning state policy with clerical interpretations of Islam. Together with the IRGC and Basij militia, these institutions form a security-centric governance complex that can override civilian initiatives.
Just over a year after the revolution began, Iran was plunged into an eight-year conflict with Iraq that would deeply shape the Islamic Republic's institutional and political trajectory. The Iran-Iraq War began on Sept. 22, 1980, when Iraqi forces under Saddam Hussein invaded Iran following months of tensions and border clashes. Saddam aimed to exploit post-revolution instability, settle long-standing disputes such as control of the Shatt al-Arab waterway and prevent revolutionary Shiite ideology from inspiring unrest within Iraq's own Shiite majority.
The war quickly became one of the 20th century's longest conventional conflicts, costing hundreds of thousands of lives and inflicting massive economic destruction. Iraq's initial offensive caught Iran off-guard, but fierce national resistance, mobilized under revolutionary slogans, stalled Baghdad's advance. By 1982, Iran had recaptured lost territory and turned the war into a grueling stalemate. Both sides engaged in trench warfare and human wave attacks, with hundreds of thousands of soldiers and civilians being killed.
During the war, Iraq enjoyed the support of several countries, including the United States, Soviet Union and the Gulf states. Starting in 1983, Iraq began using chemical weapons against Iranian forces, with the U.S. being implicated in facilitating some of these attacks. This and other incidents, such as the downing of Iran Air Flight 655 on July 3, 1988, which killed all 290 people aboard, were largely interpreted by Iran's leadership as a demonstration that the Islamic Republic's struggle with the U.S. and its allies was an existential threat.
After years of grinding attritional warfare, a U.N.-mediated ceasefire was finally accepted in July 1988, leaving neither side victorious but both profoundly transformed.
The first major nationwide unrest under the Islamic Republic occurred in July 1999, when thousands of students protested the closure of a reformist newspaper and a police raid on Tehran University dormitories. This wave of unrest, characterized by clashes with security forces and mass arrests, became a foundational moment in Iran's reform movement, especially among university students and urban middle classes demanding greater political freedoms and reforms.
A decade later, the 2009 Green Movement erupted after widely disputed presidential elections. Millions took to the streets in cities across Iran, objecting to alleged vote rigging and other policies. Although the government ultimately reasserted control through mass arrests and repression, the Green Movement demonstrated the depth of popular discontent and the capacity of social movements to mobilize across class and ideological lines.
From the government's perspective, the Green Movement was a foreign-backed conspiracy aimed at undermining the Islamic Republic and pursuing regime change. Official sources portrayed the post-election demonstrations as instigated and supported by external enemies, primarily the United States, Britain and Israel, claiming that Western-based Persian-language media was amplifying doubts about the election results. Like during other protest waves, state media highlighted massive pro-government rallies, alleging that these demonstrations dwarfed those of the Green Movement.
In the 2010s, a series of protest waves focused on economic grievances, such as the 2017–18 protests over livelihoods and inequality and the 2019 "Bloody Aban" fuel protests triggered by sudden price hikes. These movements laid the groundwork for later uprisings by exposing ongoing frustration with economic mismanagement, alleged corruption and limits on freedom of expression that resonated across Iranian society.
Sparked by the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini while in custody of Iran's morality police for allegedly violating compulsory hijab rules in September 2022, the protests rapidly spread nationwide and across social groups, drawing calls not just to end the mandatory hijab but to challenge broader restrictions on Iranian society. The government, in turn, claimed that the protests were the product of foreign meddling.
Central to the movement was the slogan "Woman, Life, Freedom," an expression of dissent against alleged gender discrimination, systemic repression and state control over personal freedoms. Demonstrators — especially women and youth — publicly removed headscarves, cut their hair and took to the streets in cities from Tehran to regional centers. By late 2022, the protests had become one of the most widespread challenges to the Islamic Republic since 1979.
Investigations and statements from Iranian authorities, including the IRGC and Intelligence Ministry, dismissed claims of police brutality in Amini's case as fabricated lies propagated by Western media. Officials said that Amini died three days after being arrested while in hospital after collapsing at a police station. Pro-government media accused Western countries of hypocrisy, the U.S. in particular, regarding the state's use of force during the protests, which the government described as "riots."
Human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have alleged widespread use of force against protesters — including the use of rifles, metal-pellet shotguns, tear gas and beatings — leading to hundreds of deaths, beatings and severe injuries.
The government's crackdown has allegedly targeted women and girls openly defying compulsory hijab laws, minority communities, activists, students and journalists. Amnesty has condemned the intensification of punitive measures, including arrests of relatives of victims and systematic harassment of those seeking justice for killings during protests.
By 2025, the use of capital punishment had been extended to protest participants, with documented executions of individuals accused of violent charges tied to demonstrations — actions denounced by human rights groups as lacking due process and aimed at instilling fear.
Iranian authorities have maintained that security forces acted responsibly to restore order against violent rioters and saboteurs, often backed by external actors, while acknowledging some protester and security force casualties.
Media and documentation have played pivotal roles in shaping both domestic protest dynamics and international sentiments toward unrest in Iran. The state's frequent internet shutdowns, throttling and censorship disrupts communication and hinders the spread of information about protests, but activists have used alternative digital tools and social platforms to communicate.
The Iranian diaspora has become integral to sustaining global visibility of protest movements. Iranians have organized rallies across Europe, North America and elsewhere, drawing attention to unrest at home, lobbying foreign governments and creating networks of support for families of victims. Iranian cultural figures, filmmakers, and artists in exile have amplified calls for human rights while condemning government repression and internet blackouts aimed at erasing evidence of abuses.
International legal actions also reflect the diaspora's impact: victims' families have filed criminal complaints in Argentina against Iranian officials for alleged crimes against humanity during the 2022 crackdown, leveraging universal jurisdiction to pursue litigation beyond Iran's borders. Tehran has dismissed the allegations.
This currency freefall directly contributed to inflation soaring above 40–48%, making basic goods, food and medicine increasingly unaffordable for ordinary Iranians.
Multiple factors underlie this downward spiral. Western analysts often point to decades of structural mismanagement, including persistent government interference in markets, currency controls, and stagnation in key industries such as manufacturing and exports, weakened economic resilience, while the Iranian government has consistently blamed sanctions and foreign interference. Meanwhile, the stock market experienced prolonged declines, reflecting collapsing investor confidence and capital flight.
Sanctions — both U.S. and multilaterally linked — have limited access to foreign currency and strangled oil export revenues, Iran's main source of hard currency. The high inflation and currency depreciation eroded living standards, particularly for lower-income groups whose wages could not keep pace with price increases. Economists warn that this deep market dysfunction is not purely cyclical but structural, rooted in both internal policy failure and external economic isolation.
International financial institutions have described these sanctions as a form of economic siege that not only hinders trade but also deters investor confidence and exacerbates currency volatility. With oil revenues constrained, Iran's capacity to support public spending and maintain exchange rate stability weakened significantly.
Policy Triggers and Structural Strain
Beyond these longstanding structural weaknesses, corruption investigations have highlighted how illicit practices, such as oil smuggling networks allegedly tied to security institutions, diverted revenue from state coffers and undercut investment in public goods.
Policy decisions in 2025 intensified these vulnerabilities. The government's decision to allow wide access to the open-market exchange rate for imports, intended to liberalize foreign exchange, instead accelerated the rial's collapse, magnifying inflation and sparking immediate public backlash. These currency reforms occurred amid attempts to cut subsidies on essentials, further reducing household buffers against price spikes.
Iran's central bank leadership shakeups and parliamentary actions — such as impeaching economic officials blamed for mismanaging the crisis — reflected political recognition of failure but did little to stabilize markets. Officials attributed much of the distress to external rivals, including sanctions and geopolitical pressures.
Iran's internal crisis has been compounded by external economic and geopolitical headwinds that reduced foreign investment, restricted access to global financial systems and intensified isolation. After the breakdown of the 2015 nuclear agreement and subsequent reinstatement and expansion of U.S. sanctions, Tehran faced restricted oil exports, blocked access to assets abroad, and difficulty in financing imports of critical goods. These factors undermined Iran’s ability to stabilize its balance of payments or buffer the currency crisis.
Meanwhile, an intense 12-day war between Iran, Israel, and the United States in June 2025 further heightened regional tensions. Israeli airstrikes on June 13 targeted Iranian military and nuclear facilities, prompting retaliatory missile and drone attacks by Iran and subsequent U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear sites in support of Israel.
A U.S.-brokered ceasefire later that month ended the conflict after causing casualties and infrastructure damage and contributing to economic sanctions and regional isolation, weakening investor confidence and exacerbating market volatility that fed into domestic discontent.
Economic forecasts paint a bleak near-term outlook. International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates project only marginal growth even as inflation remains stubbornly high. Continued depreciation of the rial, supply bottlenecks and fiscal imbalances point toward persistent instability unless Iran can implement comprehensive reforms or achieve diplomatic breakthroughs that ease sanctions.
Social indicators also reflect economic distress: poverty rates have increased, access to essential goods and medicine remains strained, and unemployment — particularly among youth — remains a significant pressure point. Economist assessments suggest that without restoring access to foreign investment and addressing systemic corruption, market dysfunction could persist or worsen, leaving Iran's economy trapped in a cycle of low growth, high inflation and instability.
Demonstrations began on Dec. 28 in Tehran's Grand Bazaar in response to Iran's economic decline, including the plummeting rial and skyrocketing inflation, and quickly spread to more than 100 cities across all 31 provinces of Iran. Observers reported protests in Tehran, Mashhad, Shiraz, Isfahan, Karaj and smaller towns, with shopkeepers closing businesses, bazaar strikes and university participation.
The movement's slogans evolved from economic grievances to broader political demands, including criticism of the country's theocratic system and calls for new leadership. In some cases, protesters chanted anti-government phrases such as "death to the dictator."
Lacking centralized leadership, the protests were primarily organic and decentralized, driven by grassroots networks of shopkeepers, students, workers and activists. This dispersed organization made coordination more resilient in the face of government repression but also harder to quantify. Despite limited formal structures, social memory of past movements and neighborhood solidarity facilitated spontaneous gatherings, strikes and marches across cities, indicating deep social mobilization across class and regional lines.
In early January 2026, as protests intensified and clashes grew deadlier, Iranian authorities imposed a near-total internet and communications blackout. On Jan. 8, access to domestic and foreign internet was largely cut, telephone networks faltered and mobile data was severely disrupted. Iranian officials justified internet and communications restrictions as security measures aimed at limiting "misinformation" and foreign interference during periods of unrest. Rights groups condemned the blackout, stating it obscured violations of human rights and the alleged violence carried out by security forces.
The blackout made independent verification of death tolls, arrests and clashes extremely difficult, leading to widely divergent estimates and reliance on leaked footage, satellite data and diaspora reporting — all of which being unreliable. Journalists inside Iran faced alleged targeted intimidation before the shutdown, and since then, domestic media have been constrained, with state media portraying protests as chaos caused by "enemies of the state."
The human cost of the 2025–2026 protests has been severe, though the extent of the state's use of force against protesters remains unclear, with the number of fatalities among protesters continuing to be highly contested. The Iranian government has said that around 3,000 people were killed during the unrest. In contrast, rights groups based outside of Iran have claimed that over 30,000 were killed, though neither of these figures can be independently verified. Amnesty International and other advocates have described the violence as mass unlawful killings, urging global diplomatic action to end impunity.
Hospitals in Tehran and other cities were overwhelmed by wounded protesters, with significant numbers of gunshot and pellet wounds, including a concentration of eye injuries — mirroring tactics seen in the 2022 protests. Security forces allegedly raided hospitals, firing tear gas and disrupting medical care and preventing blood donors from reaching wounded protesters.
Though the government acknowledged widespread anger regarding the economic situation and the need for dialogue, it argued that legitimate grievances were hijacked by foreign agendas. Officials branded protesters as "terrorists" and declared participants or supporters as "enemies of God," a charge that carries the death penalty under Iranian law. Judiciary officials have urged prosecutors to show no leniency.
Security forces — including the IRGC and Basij militia units — were deployed nationwide, using live ammunition, metal projectiles, tear gas and heavy force to disperse crowds. Reuters reported that thousands of protesters and bystanders were detained, with over 10,000 arrests cited by activist sources and at least 18,100 detentions noted by HRANA. The government's response allegedly involved home raids, arrests of minors, enforced disappearances, and severe threats against the families of activists.
The government highlighted violence perpetrated by alleged armed rioters working with the United States and Israel, emphasizing that these killings demonstrate that the movement, though based on legitimate grievances, is an external plot to destabilize the Islamic Republic and does not reflect genuine domestic unrest.
Official sources report over 100 security personnel killed nationwide, including specific figures like 30 in Isfahan province, three police officers in Shiraz, several in Tehran, and two in Qom, framing these losses as sacrifices in defense of public order against violent saboteurs who vandalized property, used weapons and targeted both security forces and civilians. According to state media, the total casualties among security forces underscore the "destructive and organized" nature of the protests
State media also noted several pro-government rallies as examples of public support. These rallies, often broadcast on state media, drew tens of thousands of participants in major cities such as Tehran, where crowds gathered in places like Enghelab Square under slogans denouncing foreign interference.
For instance, on Jan. 12, 2026, high-ranking officials including President Masoud Pezeshkian and the foreign minister joined demonstrations in Tehran, waving to supporters and emphasizing national unity against perceived external threats. Such events are typically framed by the government as spontaneous shows of loyalty to the Islamic Republic, though critics argue they are heavily coordinated by state institutions to project stability.
By Jan. 13, protest activity dropped, with only seven incidents recorded across six provinces compared to 156 on Jan. 8. In Tehran, witnesses described streets clearing of debris from earlier clashes, though isolated protests, such as a small one in Zahedan on Jan. 16, persisted.
The government's imposition of communication restrictions and heightened security measures, including fears of renewed unrest around upcoming mourning periods, have contributed to this lull, as the government claims the protests were foreign-instigated and now quelled through public vigilance. As of Feb. 2, no major nationwide demonstrations have been reported in the preceding two weeks.
Since late January, internet services have partially returned in Iran, though disruptions have still been reported.
U.S. officials publicly condemned the crackdown, including the alleged killing and detention of thousands of demonstrators, and repeatedly called on Tehran to respect human rights and permit peaceful protest, threatening to intervene militarily. Human rights groups, including Amnesty International, urged coordinated international action in response to what they described as unlawful killings and repression, and U.S. lawmakers and diplomats echoed these calls for accountability and sanctions.
At the U.N. Security Council in mid‑January 2026, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Mike Waltz declared that Washington stands with the Iranian people and that "all options are on the table" to respond to the protests, a statement that included the possibility of military measures if the alleged repression continued. Tehran responded by accusing Washington of interference.
Domestically, U.S. policy combined diplomatic pressure with economic measures, with new rounds of sanctions on Iranian officials and entities involved in suppressing protests, including figures tied to the IRGC. These measures aimed to cut access to the global financial system for actors allegedly implicated in human rights abuses while signaling U.S. commitment to human rights and pressure on Tehran's leadership.
Amid the protests, U.S. signaling to Tehran and the broader region oscillated between diplomatic pressure, economic sanctioning and military readiness. High‑level U.S. officials repeatedly warned the Iranian regime against continued mass killings, framing human rights as central to U.S. foreign policy, and emphasized that leaders responsible for repression would face consequences. This messaging was part of broader U.S. policy options that ranged from intensified sanctions and diplomatic isolation to overt threats of military action if violence continued.
The U.N. reflected this tension: Secretary‑General António Guterres publicly condemned violence and excessive force, urging restraint from all parties and warning of regional escalation risks if the crisis deepened. U.N. actors also worried that Iranian authorities could exploit geopolitical rivalries with the U.S. and Israel to justify further repression.
U.S. policy options included bolstering sanctions specifically tied to repression and human rights violations, supporting internet access technologies to counter Iranian blackouts, and engaging allies to issue coordinated diplomatic pressure through forums like the G7. The G7 foreign ministers warned Tehran that continued violent suppression could trigger additional sanctions, indicating a unified Western stance on punitive economic measures.
By late January, the U.S. had significantly increased its military presence in the Middle East, primarily through the deployment of the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier strike group. The carrier, accompanied by guided-missile destroyers equipped with Tomahawk cruise missiles and air defense systems, diverted from operations in the South China Sea and arrived in the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility around Jan. 26. Trump described the move as an "armada" heading toward Iran "just in case."
Iran responded with warnings of a "comprehensive and regret-inducing" retaliation to any aggression, conducting live-fire drills near the Strait of Hormuz and heightening alerts. U.S. allies like the UAE stated they will not allow their territory to be used for attacks on Iran.
European governments and the United Nations were strongly vocal about the situation in Iran, emphasizing human rights, restraint and diplomatic responses. The EU called on Iranian authorities to uphold freedoms of expression, association, and peaceful assembly, and to refrain from violence against protesters. European diplomatic positions stressed concern over arbitrary detentions and civilian deaths, and they repeatedly urged the restoration of communication access to allow independent reporting.
European officials also took concrete steps. For example, Italy's foreign ministry advised its citizens to leave Iran and pledged cooperation with NATO and G7 partners to safeguard human rights, while the U.K. and France condemned Tehran's actions and coordinated potential sanctions.
The U.N. Secretary‑General expressed alarm at reports of excessive use of force by Iranian authorities and called for maximum restraint and protection of civilian lives. U.N. mechanisms — including the Human Rights Council — were under pressure to consider special sessions and diplomatic action to deter further violence, with human rights NGOs urging international justice mechanisms for those responsible.
At the Security Council, divisions emerged: U.S. representatives pushed for firm action and highlighted potential intervention, while other member states — and voices from Tehran — defended Iran's sovereignty and accuse external actors of interference.
Israel's reaction to the protests and broader crisis was complex. Israeli officials publicly expressed sympathy with Iranian protesters, framing the movement as part of a larger struggle for liberty and human dignity. Israeli leaders, including the prime minister and members of intelligence agencies, stated that they "identify with the struggle of the Iranian people" and indicated intelligence support for demonstrators, albeit cautiously to avoid accusations of meddling.
Strategically, Israel continues to monitor escalating tensions closely, particularly given historical hostility with Tehran and Iranian support for militant groups like Hezbollah. Analysts note that Israel's decision not to engage more overtly militarily amid internal Iranian unrest reflected a strategic calculation: refraining from direct action could avoid fuelling Iranian nationalist sentiment and a potential rally‑round‑the‑flag effect, while still putting pressure on Tehran through allied channels.
The Iranian diaspora played a pivotal role in internationalizing the protests and shaping global perceptions. Iranians living in the U.S, Canada, and Europe organized large-scale demonstrations, rallies and vigils in solidarity with the demonstrations inside Iran, demanding democratic reforms.
Diaspora communities also functioned as vital information conduits for human rights NGOs and media outlets, documenting alleged abuses, compiling casualty data, and relaying eyewitness accounts that would otherwise be obscured by state censorship. Organizations like Iran Human Rights, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch relied extensively on diaspora networks as sources.
International cultural and media figures — including filmmakers and actors — publicly condemned Tehran's blackout and repression, framing these tactics as violations of basic freedoms and calling for global support. These voices helped sustain media interest and counter state narratives.
Among diaspora communities, Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of the deposed Shah, was a key figure regarding organization, with many Iranians rallying around him, though the impact of his influence is controversial. During the most recent protests, Pahlavi issued video messages and statements urging Iranians to take to the streets. Some reports claim that these calls led to a significant escalation, with massive crowds responding — some chanting his name and displaying pre-revolutionary symbols.
The Iranian government has repeatedly accused Pahlavi of exerting significant influence over recent protests, portraying him as a key figure in foreign-orchestrated efforts to incite riots and pursue regime change within the Islamic Republic.
Iranian officials claimed that Pahlavi, operating from the U.S. with alleged ties to the CIA and Israeli Mossad, exploited economic grievances to further stoke unrest in the country.
Overview
