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President Yoon's martial law declaration was a blatant power grab and an act of insurrection, echoing South Korea's dark legacy of authoritarian rule. Announced in a late-night decree, it deployed troops to the legislature, imposed sweeping censorship and granted warrantless arrest powers that were aimed at political opponents — all without presenting public evidence. The swift public mobilization underscored that the move violated democratic norms and was firmly rejected by both institutions and citizens.
President Yoon’s decision was not an authoritarian power grab but a brief, symbolic warning aimed at exposing pro-CCP and DPRK influence within South Korea's far-left Democratic Party. Troops deployed without ammunition, did not interfere with parliament's vote and withdrew within hours. Far from seeking prolonged control, the act was intended as a temporary shock to alert the nation to hidden threats. The opposition's backlash is politically driven, deflecting from legitimate concerns over foreign interference and national security.
Yoon's martial law stunt was less a calculated power grab than a bungled, incoherent move that baffled allies and critics alike. Poorly executed, quickly collapsing and devoid of clear purpose, it exposed staggering misjudgment at the highest level. The fiasco was political suicide that weakened the domestic conservative movement and deepened public disillusionment — on both sides of the aisle — with presidential leadership. Yoon owes the country an explanation.
Beneath the "martial law" headlines lies a deeper struggle: growing suspicion that South Korea's elections were compromised. Yoon's extraordinary move targeted the National Election Commission, long accused of shielding irregularities and resisting oversight. Cyberattacks tied to China and North Korea had already fueled doubts about vote integrity, and the failure to confront them left South Korea's democracy exposed to both domestic division and foreign manipulation.
Beyond domestic politics, the martial law debacle tarnished South Korea's hard-won reputation as one of Asia's most stable democracies. Yoon's reckless act projected instability abroad and created a dangerous leadership vacuum, undermining Western confidence in Seoul as a strategic partner and leaving the region more vulnerable to authoritarian rivals amid North Korea’s provocations, China's increasing assertiveness, and Russia's growing alignment with Pyongyang.
The constitution recognizes two forms: emergency martial law, used to address military necessity or restore order during severe disturbances, and guarding martial law, invoked when civil authorities cannot maintain public order.
Yoon declared emergency martial law — the stricter form — which enabled suspension of political activities, control over media, restrictions on public assembly and the transfer of significant judicial and policing powers to the military. The 1987 Constitution mandates parliamentary scrutiny and safeguards for civil liberties: the president must notify the National Assembly of any declaration and must lift martial law if a majority of lawmakers vote for repeal. The president cannot suspend the assembly, and members may only be arrested or detained if caught in the act of committing a crime.
Historical Use in South Korea
The December 2024 declaration marked the first nationwide martial law since 1980, when President Chun Doo-hwan used it to suppress dissent during the Gwangju Uprising — a mass protest demanding democratization in the southwestern city of Gwangju. South Korea has experienced more than a dozen martial law declarations since its founding in 1948. The 1980 enforcement became a rallying point for democratic reforms, culminating in the 1987 constitutional amendments that established direct presidential elections. In 1988, Roh Tae-woo became the first president elected by popular vote under the new system and the first to serve a single five-year term, ushering in South Korea's modern democratic era.
Backdrop for the 2024 Declaration
President Yoon cited a dual threat as justification for the 2024 martial law declaration: alleged infiltration by North Korean-backed "anti-state" groups and political gridlock that, he argued, had paralyzed state functions. His framing referenced both international security concerns and domestic political instability. The political backdrop to the declaration was defined by deep polarization and declining public support.
After winning the presidency in 2022 by the narrowest margin in the country's history — 0.7% — Yoon's approval rating had been steadily eroding, reaching a record-low 17% by early November 2024, according to Gallup Korea. The opposition Democratic Party, having won a commanding parliamentary majority in April 2024, had effectively blocked Yoon's entire legislative agenda from then onward.
At the same time, since the start of his administration, the National Assembly had introduced 22 impeachment motions against various officials, and by December 2024 — just six months into the 22nd Assembly — it was already pursuing its 10th. In his late-night declaration address, Yoon cited this record as evidence of legislative hostility and dysfunction in defending his decision to impose martial law.
Investigations Into Other Figures
Since the April 2024 parliamentary elections, opposition parties had also pressed for investigations into First Lady Kim Keon-hee, raising allegations of stock manipulation and corruption — including the so-called "Dior bag scandal," in which she was accused of accepting a luxury designer bag from a pastor with ties to North Korea. The Democratic Party and allied groups passed three separate bills to appoint a special prosecutor to probe the first lady, but each measure was vetoed by Yoon. Kim was arrested in August 2025 on charges of stock price manipulation and election meddling.
At the same time, Yoon's People Power Party had pushed for investigations targeting Democratic Party leader Lee Jae-myung, focusing on real estate development scandals during his tenure as Seongnam mayor and Gyeonggi governor, as well as alleged election law violations. Lee rejected the accusations, calling them politically motivated.
Foreign Influence Allegations
In his Dec. 12 address following the martial law declaration, Yoon claimed that North Korea had hacked South Korea's voting systems to influence the April 2024 parliamentary elections. He said the National Intelligence Service had detected the intrusion, but the National Election Commission (NEC) — a constitutionally independent body under Article 114 — had not fully cooperated with an inspection. The NEC rejected the allegations, noting that its servers are offline and use a closed network, making external hacks impossible without a USB connection, and that no compromise of votes had occurred.
A later National Assembly committee inquiry found that on the evening of Dec. 3, hours before the declaration, Yoon and Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun allegedly met with senior police officials to review plans that included occupying both the National Assembly and the NEC.
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After nearly two years of legislative warfare, Yoon faced a government paralyzed by the Democratic Party's majority. Exploiting its dominance, the opposition politicized oversight, slashed security budgets and pushed 22 impeachment motions that left prosecutors, ministers and regulators under siege. Meanwhile, the corrupt NEC refused to cooperate with legitimate election fraud probes. With the state nearing dysfunction, martial law was not a power grab but an unavoidable step to restore order and defend South Korea from institutional sabotage.
By late 2024, Yoon was politically cornered. His approval ratings had collapsed below 20%, his party had splintered and opposition challenges — through impeachment motions and budget restraints — highlighted his failures, leaving him unable to govern. Martial law promised a way to override parliament, reassert control over institutions, and silence dissent. It was not a defense of democracy but a desperate gamble — an attempt to save his presidency when survival, not the nation, was his true concern.
Yoon's reckless martial law decree was less about one man's failings than the product of a broken system. In a country bitterly split between Left and Right, the presidency still wields near-monarchical authority, creating zero-sum contests that tempt leaders to rule by decree when cornered. The crisis shows why South Korea must reform its "Imperial Presidency" by strengthening parliament, decentralizing power and ending one-man rule before democracy itself is endangered.
Yoon added that the National Assembly had "become a monster" that destroys the liberal democratic system, citing alleged infiltration by North Korean-backed groups and domestic political paralysis marked by repeated impeachment attempts, judicial intimidation and budgetary obstruction.
He pledged to "eradicate the anti-state forces and normalize the nation in the shortest possible time," stressing that while the declaration might cause some inconveniences for "the good citizens who have believed in and followed the constitutional values of a free democracy," his government would work to keep such disruptions to a minimum.
Martial Law Command Proclamation
Army Chief Park An-su, who was appointed Martial Law Commander by Yoon, issued Martial Law Command Proclamation No. 1 under the extraordinary martial law provision of the Constitution. The order suspended the activities of the National Assembly, local councils and political parties.
It also prohibited political gatherings, demonstrations and strikes. It placed all media and publications under military control, banned "fake news" and propaganda deemed to threaten liberal democracy and required striking medical personnel to return to work within 48 hours.
The proclamation also authorized warrantless arrests, searches and detentions under the Martial Law Act, while pledging to minimize disruption to ordinary citizens. In total, more than 1,600 soldiers and over 3,700 police officers were mobilized during the six hours that Yoon's martial law remained in effect.
Military and Police Deployment
On the night of the declaration, military and police forces rapidly deployed around the National Assembly, setting up security cordons and attempting to restrict access to legislators and staff. Video and CCTV footage showed troops entering the assembly, while opposition lawmakers and staff fought to block access, barricading entrances with doors and furniture and even using fire extinguishers.
Military forces were also sent to the NEC immediately following the martial law declaration. Forces entered offices managing election information systems, seized mobile phones used by five on-site staff and monitored movement while restricting entry and exit. NEC officials later stated that no data was removed or compromised.
Justification for Deployment
In his Dec. 12 address, Yoon said the deployment was intended to check the NEC's computer system in light of his claim that North Korea had hacked the country's 2024 elections, citing potential vulnerabilities that could allow data manipulation.
He further asserted that limited checks revealed weak system protections and minimal firewall safeguards. Former Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun described the deployments as a precaution to determine whether investigations into alleged election fraud in the 2024 election were necessary.
The NEC, however, dismissed Yoon's assertions as unfounded, stating that suspicions of electoral fraud were "baseless" and that the occupation of its offices and attempted seizure of electronic servers were "unconstitutional and unlawful acts" that threatened democracy, urging legal accountability for those involved.
Reports of Arrest Orders
According to reports released by the deputy director of the National Intelligence Service days after the declaration, Yoon had also ordered the arrest of key political figures as part of the martial law decree, including his own party leader Han Dong-hoon, Democratic Party leader Lee Jae-myung, and three opposition lawmakers. Han stated there was "credible evidence" Yoon had sought their detention on "anti-state charges" and planned to hold them at a detention center in the city of Gwacheon.
Yoon, however, later rejected these claims during his impeachment trial in January, denying that he had instructed commanders to remove lawmakers from parliament on the night of Dec. 3. He emphasized his "firm belief in liberal democracy" and maintained that the martial law order had been only "a formality," not intended for enforcement.
Widespread reporting described public sentiment as overwhelmingly critical, with subsequent polls taken between Dec. 3-12 showing Yoon's approval rating dropping to anywhere from 11% to 17.3%, with approximately 75% of citizens supporting his impeachment.
Parliamentary Response
Domestic opposition parties condemned the martial law declaration as an abuse of power and a threat to democratic order. Democratic Party leader — and current South Korean president — Lee Jae-myung, while livestreaming on YouTube on the night of Dec. 3, called it "illegal and unconstitutional, with no practical prerequisites to justify such an extreme measure." He also urged citizens to gather at the National Assembly and declared that Yoon "is no longer the president of South Korea."
Notably, members of Yoon's own People Power Party (PPP) also condemned the declaration, with PPP leader Han Dong-hoon describing it as "wrong" while calling for accountability and the immediate dismissal of Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun, who he claimed recommended the martial law declaration to the president.
The Emergency Resolution
By the early hours of Dec. 4, the assembly managed to convene and quickly passed its emergency resolution with a vote of 190-0, including 18 votes from the PPP. Speaker Woo Won-shik, a member of the Democratic Party, announced that the body considered the martial law decree "invalid" and called for a restoration of legislative oversight. The session was broadcast live despite attempts to block transmission, allowing millions to witness proceedings in real time.
In response to parliament's emergency resolution, the defense ministry replied that martial law would stay in effect until President Yoon ordered its repeal. The South Korean constitution obliges the president to follow parliament's decision in such cases but does not set a specific timeline for doing so.
Public Protests
As news of parliamentary resistance spread, spontaneous protests broke out in central Seoul and other major cities. Independent livestreams documented tense standoffs outside the National Assembly, drawing global attention to the scale and intensity of the response. Domestic and international reporting emphasized the speed and breadth of mobilization as a decisive factor in forcing a reversal of the martial law declaration.
Response from Rights Groups
Prominent human rights organizations, including the Centre for Military Human Rights, condemned the event as a direct breach of South Korea's international and constitutional human rights obligations. The NGO described the move as "a declaration of war against the people of the Republic of Korea." Amnesty International also warned that the declaration risked a severe rollback of democratic safeguards, stressing that it "threatens to undo decades of hard-won progress."
Media Response
Editorials in prominent South Korean and foreign outlets generally criticized the martial law as an overreach of executive power. Commentators drew comparisons to earlier periods of authoritarian rule under leaders like Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan and stressed the importance of restoring constitutional order. While a range of political perspectives was reported, there were no prominent examples in reviewed sources of organized public support for the martial law.
Response from International Community
Initial reactions from foreign governments predominantly included expressions of concern. Several outlets noted mounting global apprehension about the implications for South Korean democracy, while others discussed the crisis as a potential challenge for the U.S.–ROK alliance and efforts to deter North Korean military provocations. Statements from U.S. and EU diplomatic officials, reported by The Washington Post and Fox News, privately expressed grave concern and urged a peaceful, lawful resolution to the political crisis.
Military Response to Order
Testimony later revealed that some senior military leaders expressed doubts about the constitutionality of Yoon's order. Kwak Jong-geun, head of the Special Warfare Command, said Yoon ordered him to remove lawmakers from the National Assembly to block a vote rescinding martial law, but Kwak ultimately decided not to carry out the order, describing the deployment as "unacceptable."
Kim Hyun-tae, commander of the 707th Special Mission Group, reported following instructions to secure the Assembly but later emphasized his troops were "victims who were used" and took responsibility for their actions. He said soldiers only defended themselves during confrontations with citizens, with no intent to use force against them. Yoon has denied ordering commanders to remove lawmakers from the National Assembly to prevent them from participating in a resolution vote.
The turning point occurred when the National Assembly, meeting under military cordons and with troops blocking entrances, passed its emergency resolution by a 190–0 vote. Under the Constitution, martial law may be repealed if a majority of lawmakers approve. In the current 300-member Assembly, 151 votes were required to overturn the measure.
Following the vote, Speaker Woo Won-shik declared the martial law decree void and insisted it be repealed immediately, emphasizing that the president had failed to notify the assembly of the martial law declaration as required by the constitution. He pledged that lawmakers would "protect democracy with the people" and called on the military and police to withdraw from the legislative compound.
Troop Withdrawal From National Assembly
Troops stationed around the assembly — who did not interfere with parliament's vote — reportedly complied soon after. Woo praised the quick withdrawal as evidence of the "maturity of our military" despite South Korea's history of coups. Democratic Party leader, Lee Jae-myung, announced that his caucus would remain in the assembly's main hall until the decree was formally lifted by Yoon, while protests swelled in downtown Seoul with labor unions, students and civic groups staging overnight demonstrations.
Revocation of Martial Law
Nearly three and a half hours after parliament passed its emergency resolution, President Yoon delivered a televised briefing amid united parliamentary opposition, internal party dissent and nationwide protests. He announced that martial law would be lifted once a quorum was reached for a cabinet meeting and confirmed that troops had already been withdrawn from the National Assembly. Minutes later, the cabinet formally approved the motion. The decree was rescinded, the Martial Law Command disbanded and restrictions on gatherings, political activities and media reporting came to an end.
Yoon cited the National Assembly’s 190–0 vote as the decisive reason for lifting the order. After the decree was lifted, the presidential office defended Yoon's actions in comments to foreign media, insisting that the measure had been "strictly enforced within the framework of the Constitution" and scheduled at night to "minimize damage to the national economy and citizens' daily lives."
The immediate aftermath shifted into a constitutional standoff, as the Democratic Party convened an emergency meeting at the assembly on Dec. 4 and declared that Yoon's martial law order was "a clear violation of the Constitution" and "a serious act of rebellion." Party leaders warned that unless he resigned, they would move to impeach him. That same day, the National Assembly formally initiated impeachment proceedings against the president under Article 65 of the Constitution.
In a reported meeting with Prime Minister Han Duck-soo and PPP leader Han Dong-hoon on Dec. 4, Yoon insisted there was "no wrongdoing," framing martial law as a "warning" against what he described as the opposition's "abuse of impeachment powers." Later that day, 190 lawmakers from six opposition parties submitted an impeachment motion, asserting that the order violated Article 77 of the constitution, which reserves martial law "to cope with a military necessity or to maintain the public safety… in time of war, armed conflict, or similar national emergency."
Yoon's Apology
On Dec. 7, Yoon issued a televised apology for the martial law declaration, stating that he would not attempt a second declaration. He described the decision as a
"desperate decision made by me, the president, as the final authority responsible for state affairs," and expressed regret for causing public concern. Yoon also pledged to take "full legal and political responsibility" and said he would leave the stabilization of the political situation and his term to his party.
Motions to Impeach
The National Assembly's first attempt to vote on impeachment occurred later that day on Dec. 7. The vote did not pass, as only 195 lawmakers were present — five short of the 200 required for impeachment — after all PPP members except three boycotted the session. Mounting protests, however, sustained public pressure and deepened fissures within the PPP.
Notably, on Dec. 12, after having issued an apology days earlier, Yoon once again defended his martial law declaration in another televised address, describing it as a legitimate "act of governance" and denying any intent to foment insurrection. He vowed to "fight to the end" to prevent forces he said had been paralyzing the government and threatening the constitutional order.
On Dec. 14, the Assembly held a second vote, in which 204 lawmakers — including 12 members from the PPP — supported impeachment, surpassing the required two-thirds majority in the 300-member chamber. The adoption of the motion resulted in Yoon's immediate suspension from office pending a deliberation by the Constitutional Court, as stipulated under Article 65 of the Constitution. On April 4, 2025, South Korea's Constitutional Court unanimously voted to remove Yoon Suk Yeol from office.
Following the suspension, Prime Minister Han Duck-soo was sworn in as acting president. However, he too was impeached on Dec. 27, leaving Finance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Choi Sang-mok to assume the role. Han was later reinstated on Mar. 24, 2025, when the Constitutional Court overturned his impeachment.
The warrant was requested by a joint investigation team from the Corruption Investigation Office for High-ranking Officials (CIO) after Yoon ignored three summonses to appear for questioning. Under South Korean law, a sitting president can be arrested if accused of insurrection.
Yoon's attorneys immediately challenged the decision, arguing that the investigation team "does not have the authority to investigate an insurrection" and that the martial law declaration was constitutional. They also argued that the ongoing impeachment proceedings and deliberations by the Constitutional Court against the president should take priority over any criminal matters.
Arrest Attempts and Stop the Steal Protests
Yoon initially resisted arrest, remaining in his presidential residence surrounded by supporters and protected by the Presidential Security Service. Beginning in early January, thousands of demonstrators carrying South Korean and American flags converged outside the compound in what became known as the “Stop the Steal” protests. Some protesters said they hoped international allies — including then-incoming U.S. President Donald Trump — would back Yoon's claims.
The demonstrations drew thousands at their height, with protesters blocking police lines during attempts to enforce the arrest warrant. On Jan. 3, 2025, when authorities attempted to enforce the warrant, protesters and security personnel blocked access, resulting in a six-hour standoff before investigators withdrew. A second arrest attempt took place on Jan. 15. This time, however, Yoon was detained and transported to the CIO office in Gwacheon.
The protests escalated further on Jan. 19, when supporters of Yoon forcibly entered the Seoul Western District Court in response to a formal arrest warrant issued by Judge Cha Eun-kyung. This warrant extended Yoon's prior detainment, allowing authorities to hold him for up to 20 days pending a decision on indictment, citing concerns that he might destroy evidence related to the martial law investigation.
According to police reports, protesters breached police lines, damaged CIO vehicles, shattered windows, and entered the courthouse, engaging in assaults on police officers and journalists and causing property damage. A total of 86 individuals were arrested over the course of two days.
On Jan. 26, prosecutors indicted Yoon for leading an alleged insurrection — marking the first time a South Korean president faced both arrest and indictment.
This marked only the second time in South Korean history that a president had been ousted via constitutional procedure, the first being Park Geun-hye in 2017. The court found that Yoon's declaration of martial law violated Article 77 of the Constitution and the Martial Law Act, noting that no national emergency existed.
The court added that such decisions required procedures — including deliberation and approval by the State Council ("Cabinet") and notification of the National Assembly — which had not been followed. It further held that Yoon's mobilization of security forces to obstruct lawmakers and restrict political activity infringed on representative democracy and separation of powers.
Notably, the court had also determined that Yoon's actions revived the country's authoritarian past, when presidents misused emergency powers to suppress dissent. Referencing the martial law abuses of Syngman Rhee, Park Chung-hee, Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, the opinion underscored that such powers had not been invoked since 1979–81 precisely because democracy had since taken root.
Public Response
Public response was deeply polarized. Large crowds converged outside the constitutional court and throughout Seoul as the verdict was announced, with some celebrating the ruling as a stand against autocracy, while others accused the court of exceeding its authority. A Gallup Korea poll conducted before the ruling from April 1–3, recorded that 60% of respondents supported the Constitutional Court's decision to uphold Yoon Suk Yeol's impeachment, while 35% opposed it.
Following the ruling, Prime Minister Han Duck-soo assumed the role of acting president, as mandated by Article 71 of the Constitution. It was announced on Apr. 8 that a snap presidential election would be held within 60 days, with a detailed timeline to be released promptly to ensure stability and public trust.
The decision's legacy is expected to influence long-term debates over presidential authority, civil-military relations, and the limits of executive emergency powers.
History of Impeachments
Before Yoon Suk-yeol, only two presidents in South Korea had been impeached: Roh Moo-hyun in 2004, whose impeachment was overturned by the constitutional court, and Park Geun-hye in 2017, who was permanently removed from office and later convicted of corruption-related charges. Yoon's impeachment and subsequent arrest mark the first instance of a sitting president facing both impeachment and indictment on insurrection charges.
Contemporary Debate
The crisis continues to generate sharp debate within South Korea. Yoon and his legal team maintain that the declaration of martial law was constitutional and necessary for safeguarding national security. Supporters have demonstrated in mass protests, dubbed "Yoon Again!" rallies, calling for the former president's return. In contrast, opposition parties, civic groups and international democracy advocates largely characterize it as an unconstitutional power grab that threatened the foundations of democratic governance. Comparisons with earlier episodes of martial law — particularly the Gwangju Uprising of 1980 — underscore lingering public concerns about the risk of authoritarian relapse.
2025 Constitutional Reforms
In response to those concerns, the National Assembly approved reforms in July 2025 tightening the country's martial law framework, including provisions that prevent security forces from obstructing legislators or entering the National Assembly building without the speaker's consent. The reforms were enacted under the leadership of newly elected President Lee Jae-myung, who rose to power in the Jun. 3, 2025 snap election following Yoon's impeachment.
Yoon's Criminal Trial
As of August 2025, Yoon's trial on charges of insurrection, obstruction of justice, and related offenses is ongoing at the Seoul Central District Court. After first being arrested in January, he was released in March when his detention was overturned on a technicality, but was rearrested in July over fears he might destroy evidence.
Prosecutors are presenting extensive documentary evidence and testimony from military officers, while Yoon's defense argues that the martial law order was a temporary political "message" rather than an insurrection. A first verdict is expected in late 2025, with possible penalties ranging from a lengthy prison sentence to the death penalty, though South Korea has not carried out an execution since 1997.
Overview
