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There's a "wall of fear-mongering and doomerism" in the AI world right now.

"Worrying about AI today is like worrying about overpopulation on Mars."

Concerns that AI could pose a threat to humanity is "preposterously ridiculous."

Claiming AI poses an existential threat is "such an extreme" and risks "wip[ing] out some of its potential benefits."

"I'm more concerned about... the risks that are here and now [than the existential threat of AI]."

Current AI is "not anywhere close" to posing an existential threat but it could in the future.

AI is the "biggest existential threat" to humanity.

AGI's worst-case scenario would be "lights-out for all of us."

Powerful AI systems "taking control" pose an "existential threat."

AI has a "10 to 25 per cent" chance of destroying humanity.

"The most likely result of building a superhumanly smart AI... is that literally everyone on Earth will die."

Does AI Pose an Existential Threat to Humanity?

Chinese AI developer Moonshot told the BBC on Wednesday that it is carrying out an internal review after the security firm Mindgard bypassed safeguards on its Kimi K2.6 and K3 Swarm, prompting the agents to describe biological weapons production and assassination planning.

Chinese AI developer Moonshot told the BBC on Wednesday that it is carrying out an internal review after the security firm Mindgard bypassed safeguards on its Kimi K2.6 and K3 Swarm, prompting the agents to describe biological weapons production and assassination planning.

Mindgard identified the vulnerabilities in July and emailed Moonshot on July 27, before publishing a blog post about the issue on September 12. Mindgard said Moonshot had only responded recently, after the BBC contacted the company for comment.

Mindgard identified the vulnerabilities in July and emailed Moonshot on July 27, before publishing a blog post about the issue on September 12. Mindgard said Moonshot had only responded recently, after the BBC contacted the company for comment.

Mindgard researcher Jim Nightingale reported that he jailbroke Kimi by eliciting the AI's system instructions and exploiting its custom memory by placing the jailbreak in a local DWS directory inside Kimi's authentication tree. He then used new systemic instructions to create an unrestricted persona called "Apeiron," Ancient Greek for "unlimited" or "boundless."

Mindgard researcher Jim Nightingale reported that he jailbroke Kimi by eliciting the AI's system instructions and exploiting its custom memory by placing the jailbreak in a local DWS directory inside Kimi's authentication tree. He then used new systemic instructions to create an unrestricted persona called "Apeiron," Ancient Greek for "unlimited" or "boundless."

Activated by the commands "&lt;user_exits&gt;" and "&lt;Apeiron&gt;," the jailbreak produced outputs on explosives, malware and chemical agents, including detailed instructions and compositions for creating sarin gas, a potent nerve agent.

Activated by the commands "" and "," the jailbreak produced outputs on explosives, malware and chemical agents, including detailed instructions and compositions for creating sarin gas, a potent nerve agent.

Moonshot told the BBC it welcomed third-party input as "a key pillar for building better and safer AI" and said internal evaluations showed a high refusal rate for similar requests. It is now discussing the findings with Mindgard.

Moonshot told the BBC it welcomed third-party input as "a key pillar for building better and safer AI" and said internal evaluations showed a high refusal rate for similar requests. It is now discussing the findings with Mindgard.

It comes as Anthropic recently revealed that it had disrupted attempts to use Claude for activity that could support biological weapons development. Meanwhile, Google's threat intelligence team reported entities attempting to use Gemini to acquire step-by-step guides on "synthesizing weaponized biological agents."

It comes as Anthropic recently revealed that it had disrupted attempts to use Claude for activity that could support biological weapons development. Meanwhile, Google's threat intelligence team reported entities attempting to use Gemini to acquire step-by-step guides on "synthesizing weaponized biological agents."

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Moonshot, the Chinese developer of the Kimi AI models, said it is carrying out an internal review after the security firm Mindgard bypassed safeguards on Kimi K2.6 and K3 Swarm, prompting them to describe biological weapons production and assassination planning.

Moonshot, the Chinese developer of the Kimi AI models, said it is carrying out an internal review after the security firm Mindgard bypassed safeguards on Kimi K2.6 and K3 Swarm, prompting them to describe biological weapons production and assassination planning.

Mindgard identified the vulnerabilities in July and emailed Moonshot on July 27, publishing a blog post about the issue on Sept. 12. The firm said Moonshot only responded recently, after the BBC contacted the company for comment.

Mindgard identified the vulnerabilities in July and emailed Moonshot on July 27, publishing a blog post about the issue on Sept. 12. The firm said Moonshot only responded recently, after the BBC contacted the company for comment.

Moonshot told the BBC it welcomed third-party input as "a key pillar for building better and safer AI" and said internal evaluations showed a high refusal rate for such requests. It is now in discussions with Mindgard about the findings.

Moonshot told the BBC it welcomed third-party input as "a key pillar for building better and safer AI" and said internal evaluations showed a high refusal rate for such requests. It is now in discussions with Mindgard about the findings.

Mindgard researcher Jim Nightingale said the bypass was triggered by two short inputs and produced outputs on explosives, malware and chemical agents. The firm said it withheld details needed to reproduce the technique.

Mindgard researcher Jim Nightingale said the bypass was triggered by two short inputs and produced outputs on explosives, malware and chemical agents. The firm said it withheld details needed to reproduce the technique.

Kimi is an open-weight model, meaning it can be downloaded and run on private infrastructure. Mindgard said a jailbroken Kimi 2.6 could let hackers execute code and reach the internet, making it a possible launchpad for cyberattacks.

Kimi is an open-weight model, meaning it can be downloaded and run on private infrastructure. Mindgard said a jailbroken Kimi 2.6 could let hackers execute code and reach the internet, making it a possible launchpad for cyberattacks.

Anthropic said it disrupted attempts to use Claude for activity that could support biological weapons development, while Google's threat intelligence team reported adversaries targeting proprietary AI models, code and credentials in the second quarter of 2026.

Anthropic said it disrupted attempts to use Claude for activity that could support biological weapons development, while Google's threat intelligence team reported adversaries targeting proprietary AI models, code and credentials in the second quarter of 2026.

Polite policy language stapled onto a model means nothing when a couple of stray phrases can strip every guardrail and hand over weapons recipes on demand. Ignoring a responsible disclosure about that kind of hole is the real scandal, especially with agentic systems that can act, code and spread the compromise. Safety has to be built into the architecture, not wished into existence.

Polite policy language stapled onto a model means nothing when a couple of stray phrases can strip every guardrail and hand over weapons recipes on demand. Ignoring a responsible disclosure about that kind of hole is the real scandal, especially with agentic systems that can act, code and spread the compromise. Safety has to be built into the architecture, not wished into existence.

Serious security work runs through a defined process: private advisories, a dedicated address, version details, reproduction steps and an impact assessment. Coordinated disclosure with a fix before publicity protects users, while splashy public write-ups mostly hand a roadmap to bad actors. Responsible researchers understand the difference between fixing a problem and advertising it.

Serious security work runs through a defined process: private advisories, a dedicated address, version details, reproduction steps and an impact assessment. Coordinated disclosure with a fix before publicity protects users, while splashy public write-ups mostly hand a roadmap to bad actors. Responsible researchers understand the difference between fixing a problem and advertising it.

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Biological & chemical weapons

Polite policy language stapled onto a model means nothing when a couple of stray phrases can strip every guardrail and hand over weapons recipes on demand. Moonshot ignoring this for so long is the real scandal, especially when its agents can act, code and spread the compromise. Safety has to be built into the architecture, not wished into existence.

Polite policy language stapled onto a model means nothing when a couple of stray phrases can strip every guardrail and hand over weapons recipes on demand. Moonshot ignoring this for so long is the real scandal, especially when its agents can act, code and spread the compromise. Safety has to be built into the architecture, not wished into existence.

Moonshot handles its models' safety seriously. Security, however, is a defined process: private advisories, a dedicated address, version details, reproduction steps and an impact assessment. Instead of hastily advertising vulnerabilities through flashy write-ups, Moonshot pursues coordinated disclosures that wait until a fix is readily available.

Moonshot handles its models' safety seriously. Security, however, is a defined process: private advisories, a dedicated address, version details, reproduction steps and an impact assessment. Instead of hastily advertising vulnerabilities through flashy write-ups, Moonshot pursues coordinated disclosures that wait until a fix is readily available.

Moonshot Reviews Kimi AI After Bioweapon Jailbreak Found

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